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Preliminary references: challenges and legal 
conditions in Hungarian domestic law 
The accession of Hungary to the European Union entails new challenges for the 
Hungarian courts. Successful adaptation may especially be hindered by the fact 
that there is no comprehensive judicial practice for the application of law of 
foreign origin. Moreover, stemming from the traditional positivist approach and 
the dualist constitutional practice, Hungarian courts have shown reluctance to 
apply legal rules of foreign origin directly, including international legal rules 
adopted by Hungary, too. 
1. General sources of adaptation difficulties 
The general and foreseeable difficulties of adaptation — which constitute the 
source of uncertainty — can be summarised in four points. 
Requirements of the knowledge of and expertise in Community law. This 
is a major challenge in view of the volume of Community law. The courts have 
to make an effort even to follow the constant changes of domestic law. This 
burden will double when the same requirements have to be met concerning 
Community law. 
Requirement of interpreting domestic law in harmony with Community 
law. The Von Colson principle, extended with the statements made in the 
Grimaldi, Miret and Marleasing cases, places serious requirements on national 
courts.' According to this, the obligation of national courts to interpret the law 
of the Member State in harmony with the law of the Community is based on 
' Case 14/83 Sabine von Colson and Elisabeth Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [ 1984] 
ECR 0189, par. 26., Case C-322/88 Salvatore Grimaldi v. Fonds des maladies professionnelles 
[1989] ECR 4407, par. 19., Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de 
Alimentacion SA [ 1990] ECR 1-4135, par. 8., Case C-334/92 Teodoro Wagner Miret v Fondo de 
Garantía Salarial [1993] ECR 1-6911, par. 20. 
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Article 10 of the EC Treaty. This ensues from the fact that the Member States 
and their organs (courts) are obliged to promote the realisation of Community 
goals while ensuring the effective enforcement of Community law. 
The fulfilment of this requirement postulates the comprehensive knowledge 
of Community law and at the same time the comprehension of the relationship 
of national law and Community law. 
Raising of questions of Community law by the national courts. By the 
Peterbroeck decision and partly by the Van Schijndel decision the European 
Court of Justice set up requirements for national courts with respect to the 
application of Community law.' Ensuing from this obligation, Community law 
shall be applied not only when it is invoked by one of the parties. The national 
court is obliged to consider Community legal rules even in the absence of such 
pleading by the parties. Domestic legal rules hindering this are in conflict with 
the Community legal order. 
The effect of the difficulty mentioned in point (1) is multiplied by this 
requirement. The reason for this is that courts cannot necessarily count on the 
parties in litigation as regards the application of Community . law. The 
responsibility of the courts is increased considerably by the enforcement of the 
Tura novit curia principle in such a way. 
Material and procedural difficulties with the preliminary ruling 
procedure. In the course of the application of Community law Hungarian courts 
will encounter legal questions for the solution of which the help of the 
European Court of Justice will have to be sought. The preliminary ruling 
procedure, which provides the procedural conditions for this, will have several 
initial difficulties in store for the Hungarian courts. An especially important 
question is how this procedure based on Community law can be fitted into 
Hungarian procedural law. 
It is very difficult to estimate the future number of references for 
preliminary ruling submitted from Hungary. The national courts of some 
Member States are known to use this possibility more frequently than the courts 
of other states. From among the present Member States, the legal system, legal 
practice and legal approach of Austria undoubtedly show great similarity with 
those of Hungary. Austrian courts use and have used the means of preliminary 
ruling readily. One could infer from this that Hungarian courts will act in the 
same manner, but it is by no means certain. 
As concerns the above challenges, the present article is focusing on how 
Hungarian law is trying to fit the preliminary ruling procedure into the 
framework of its legal system. The reason for this choice is that, the Hungarian 
2 Case C-312/93 Peterbroeck, Van Campenhout & Cie SCS v Belgium [ 1995] ECR 1-4599, 
paras. 20-21., Joined Cases C-430/93 and C-431/93 Jeroen van Schijndel and Johannes Nicolaas 
Cornelis van Veen v Stichting Pensioenfonds voor Fysiotherapeuten [ 1995] ECR 1-4705. 
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Parliament has recently amended both the Code of Civil Procedure and the 
Code of Criminal Procedure. The preliminary ruling procedure is incorporated 
into the Hungarian procedural law by the amendment, by means of 
supplementing the existing rules. 
2. Incorporation of the preliminary ruling procedure into Hungarian law 
The preliminary ruling procedure will be the most important institutional 
connection between Hungarian courts and Community courts. This procedure 
may entail several major or minor problems for national courts, and Hungary is 
not likely to be an exception. 
The duty or right of national courts to refer ensues directly from Community 
law, and it is independent of the existence of any national rule. This is a sui 
generis procedure. National legal rules can supplement but cannot restrict these 
rules of the Union or within this of the Community (hereafter law of the 
European Union). 3 It follows from this that the national court can make a 
reference for preliminary ruling even if its own domestic law does not regulate 
it or its procedural framework.. The domestic law of several Member States 
does not contain separate procedural provisions about referring for preliminary 
ruling (with the exception of, for example, Scotland, England and Wales, or 
Austria). 4 The absence of domestic legal regulation does not impede 
preliminary . references. 
The aim of the amendment of the Hungarian rules of procedural law is to 
dispel several uncertainties pertaining to references for preliminary ruling after 
the accession. The amendment contains three supplementary rules which do not 
ensue from the legal rules of the Union concerning preliminary ruling: first, it 
prescribes the suspension of the procedure in the case of reference for 
preliminary ruling; second, it regulates the right of appeal; and third, it 
prescribes that the Ministry of Justice shall be informed about the preliminary 
reference. 
The general part of the Explanation attached to the amendment extends 
much beyond the usual framework, the aim and functions of the preliminary 
ruling procedure as well as its role in the Union are described in short, with 
some references made to the decisions of the European Court of Justice. The 
Explanation gives the Hungarian courts applying the amendment a general, 
comprehensive view about the essence of the whole legal procedure and may 
serve as the basis for its application. 
3 See e.g. Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal SpA [ 1978] 
ECR 0629, paras. 20-22., Case C-348/89 Mecanarte — Metalurgica da Lagoa Lda v Chefe do 
Servigo da Conferencia Final da Alfándega do Porto [1991] ECR 1-3277, par. 45. 
4 Association of the Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the 
European Union. 18th colloquium in Helsinki, 20 and 21 May 2002. General report, point 3.3 
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In the following some questions of the preliminary ruling procedure are 
going to be highlighted in connection with the amendment of procedural rules. 
3. Scope of the preliminary ruling procedure 
The amendment of the rules of civil procedure regulates only preliminary 
ruling initiated on the basis of the EC Treaty, while the amendment of criminal 
procedure also refers to the EU Treaty. According to the Explanation this is 
due to the fact that the fields regulated by the EU Treaty (third pillar) concern 
only criminal law, not civil law.' However, the definition of the legal grounds 
of preliminary ruling seems to be insufficient even with such reasoning. 
The national courts can make preliminary references on the basis of 
several rules of law. Actually, several preliminary ruling procedures exist in the 
law of the European Union, and their conditions and rules may differ in many 
aspects. In view of this, it is difficult to understand why the amendment sets the 
aim of establishing the applicability of the preliminary ruling procedure based 
only on Article 234 of the EC Treaty.' Hungarian courts may find themselves in 
a situation in which they have to refer for preliminary ruling on the basis of 
another provision. Thus the amendment of the Code of Criminal Procedure also 
refers to Article 35 of the EU Treaty as a matter of course. 
Preliminary ruling procedure is provided for not only by Articles 68 and 234 
of the EC Treaty and Article 35 of the EU Treaty, but also by Article 150 of the 
EURATOM Treaty and by several international treaties concluded by the 
Member States within the Union. The latter ones are not referred to in the 
amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure or Code of Criminal Procedure. 
Although preliminary ruling procedures based on the EURATOM Treaty are 
very rare, the possibility cannot be excluded. If a Hungarian court wishes to 
refer for a preliminary ruling procedure not on the basis of the EC Treaty or EU 
Treaty, it cannot make a reference to the amended provisions of either the Code 
of Civil Procedure or the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
As concerns the regulated scope of the procedures, it is also disputable 
that the amendment of the rules of civil procedure do not even refer to the EU 
Treaty. The Explanation of the amendment points out rightly that cases, which 
arise on the basis of the EU Treaty and which can be referred to preliminary 
ruling (police and judicial cooperation in criminal and customs matters), occur 
typically in criminal procedure in the Hungarian legal system. However, there 
are problems arising in this field which can also be encountered in civil cases 
(for example, data protection, customs matters and some other questions of 
' Explanation, Particular Provisions /5. §/ point 4. 
6  Explanation, General Part point 1/1.1 
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public administration). It would hardly have been unnecessary to refer to the 
EU Treaty in the amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the lack 
of this is of slight importance in practice as the court proceeding in civil cases 
is entitled (or in some cases is obliged) to make preliminary references to the 
European Court of Justice in the absence of national legal rules, too. 
(3) The regulations of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of 
Criminal Procedure concern only the preliminary ruling procedure in the 
European Court of Justice. The present situation is reflected rightly by this part 
of the amendment. However, it is important to remember that the European 
Union Treaty and the Treaty of Nice (Nice, 2001) on the amendment of treaties 
establishing the European Communities and of certain associated documents 
made it possible that, according to 225(3) of the amended EC Treaty and 
Article 140a of the EURATOM Treaty, the other Community court, the Court 
of First Instance can also proceed and make a preliminary ruling in certain 
cases defined in the Statute of the Community courts. The Statute has not been 
amended in such a way, thus the Court of First Instance is not yet entitled to 
proceed in a preliminary ruling procedure. In future, however, this possibility 
must also be considered, and then the reference made by the present 
amendment will prove to be too limited. 
4. Suspension of the procedure 
In the practice of the national courts the preliminary reference may entail the 
suspension of the procedure, but it is not necessarily so. The first sentence of 
Article 23 of the Statute of the European Court of Justice refers to the 
possibility of suspending the procedure, but this can hardly be interpreted as if 
the suspension of the procedure was made compulsory. 
The practice shows great variety in this respect, too. In some countries 
suspension is automatic, thus the general rule is that during the time of 
reference the court cannot make any procedural acts (e.g. Austrian courts of 
public administration, Finnish supreme court of public administration).' In 
some it depends on the proceeding court whether the case is suspended (e.g. 
England and Wales).' In other countries the procedure may go on during the 
period of reference concerning questions not affected by the legal question in 
the reference, such as production of evidence (e.g. Danish and Dutch courts). 9 
There are countries in which during the period of reference not only can certain 
procedural acts be taken but a partial judgement can also be made concerning 
the parties not involved in the legal question in the reference, or concerning the 
See note 4: Austrian report, point 2.13, Finnish report, point 2.13. 
See note 4: English—Welsh report, point 2.8 
9  See note 4: Dannish report, point 2.13, Dutch report, point 2.9 
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part of the case not affected by it (e.g. the French Conseil d'Etat or the public 
administration court of Luxemburg). The Greek Council of State is entitled to 
make a partial judgement with respect to the parties not concerned even in its 
reference if their case can be separated.'° 
The automatic suspension — of binding force without exception — of the 
procedure in the case of preliminary reference cannot be justified in every case. 
The general duration of the preliminary ruling procedure exceeds two years. In 
many cases certain procedural acts- not directly affecting the reference for 
preliminary ruling could be taken during this period (e.g. production of 
evidence). As the reference need not necessarily be based on the complete facts 
of the case, the case may have parts or aspects independent of the reference. 
The amendment of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal 
Procedure regulates the suspension of the procedure as ' a compulsory 
consequence in the case of preliminary reference. This solution may not lead to 
desirable results in every case. Procedural acts are allowed by the Hungarian 
Code of Civil Procedure for the duration of suspension only in exceptional 
cases. Thus, in certain cases, compulsory suspension may further delay the 
procedure. In some cases it is useful to carry out certain procedural acts with 
the purpose of saving time during the period of the preliminary ruling 
procedure. However, this is precluded by the Code of Civil Procedure. Similar 
considerations may be valid as concerns the issue of suspending criminal 
procedure. These arguments could support more flexible regulation — 
especially in civil cases —, when the proceeding court would decide for or 
against the suspension of the case referring the case to the Court of Justice, 
even if this would fit into the system of the civil procedure not so easily. 
S. Decision to refer: possibility of appeal 
The possibility of appeal against the decision of the national court to refer for 
preliminary ruling is a very important question in the light of the fact that the 
appeal essentially restricts the right of the national court to refer for preliminary 
ruling. The European Court of Justice has stated in several cases: Article 234 of 
the EC Treaty makes it possible for national courts to make preliminary 
references freely and to weigh its necessity." However, according to the Court, 
Article 234 does not preclude the possibility of appeal against the decision on 
reference, this is regulated by domestic law. The Treaty does not give 
autonomy to the referring court in the case when domestic law provides the 
"" See note 4: French report, point 3.1, Greek report, point 2.13 
" I E.g. Case 166/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- and Vorratsstelle für Getreide and 
Futtermittel [1974] ECR 0033, paras. 3-4. or Case C-261/95 Rosalba Palmisani v Istituto 
nazionale della previdenza sociale (INPS) [ 1997] ECR 1-4025, par. 20. 
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possibility of ordinary legal remedy against the reference. 12 Naturally, in this 
case it is up to the parties in litigation whether they will question the reference 
with an appeal. The practice in the Member States differs, several states (e.g. 
Ireland, Italy, Belgium) . do not permit to appeal against the decision to refer. 13 
In Hungary the possibility of appeal is introduced or maintained in the 
Hungarian practice by the amendment of the law — with certain restrictions — in 
the case of referring for preliminary ruling. However, there are some problems 
associated with this. 
(/) According to the new rules, in civil procedure it is possible to appeal 
against the decision to refer during the procedure of first instance, while no 
such possibility opens in the case of the decision not to refer. In the procedure 
of second instance the possibility to appeal opens in both cases. 
— The different regulation of the possibility to appeal in the procedures of 
first and second instance is justified by all means. In the procedure of first 
instance the court usually has the right but not the duty to refer. In the 
procedure of second instance the duty to refer may also arise under the 
existence of certain conditions laid down in the law of the European Union 
(this is true only generally and not in all cases). Thus, if the proceeding court 
may have the duty to refer, it is appropriate to provide the possibility to appeal 
in the case when the motion of the party in litigation to this purpose is 
dismissed by the court. The basis of the appeal will be that in spite of the 
existence of the conditions determined in the law of the European Union, the 
proceeding court failed to decide to refer for preliminary ruling, or did so in 
spite of the absence of such conditions. 
— In the civil procedure of first instance it is possible to appeal only against 
the decision to refer (and at the same time against suspension). However, the 
problem is made more complex by the fact that in this case the court has no 
duty to refer. At the same time it also means that even if all the conditions of 
referring for preliminary ruling exist, the court of first instance may decide not 
to exercise this right but to decide the legal dispute without the opinion of the 
European Court of Justice. There would be no sense in providing the possibility 
to appeal against the decision denying reference for preliminary ruling as there 
would be no grounds for such appeal. The court is free to decide not to refer, 
thus the review has no specified scope. If, in the absence of reference, no 
proper judgement on the merits is made, the interested party can object to the 
refusal of reference in his appeal against the judgement on the merits. 
12 Case 13/61 Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus en Uitdenbogerd v Robert Bosch GmbH and 
Maatschappij tot voortzetting van de zaken der Firma Willem van Rijn [1962] ECR 0089, Case 
146/73 Rheinmühlen-Düsseldorf v Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel 
[ 1974] ECR 0139, par. 3. 
13 ANDERSON, D.W.K. — DEMETRIOU, M.: References to the European Court. London 2002. p. 
215. 
534 — LÁSZLÓ BLUTMAN 
— It is possible to appeal against the decision to refer made by the court of 
first instance. According to the Explanation of the amendment, in this case the 
review may be aimed at examining whether the conditions of the reference 
correspond to the conditions laid down in the law of the European Union. In the 
absence thereof, the reference may prove groundless (and possibly dismissed by 
the European Court of Justice without any examination of merit), and a lot of 
time will be wasted unnecessarily during the procedure. Thus the court may be 
mistaken with respect to the applicability of the rule of law to be interpreted to 
the facts of the case in question, may word the wrong questions and may state 
the facts of the case and set forth the relevant Hungarian law in the decision 
wrongly. 
I hold the view that the possibility of review in these questions is essentially 
very limited. The possibility of reviewing the (temporary) facts of the case set 
forth in the decision to refer — excluding exceptional cases — is illusory in fact. 
The expounding of domestic law and the wording of the questions is rather a 
technical problem, too. Rarely does the latter one hinder preliminary ruling by 
the European Court of Justice. 
Review on the merits may be limited only to establishing whether the 
formulation of the question corresponds to the basic conditions. Thus, for 
example, the question may not contain the interpretation of the domestic legal 
norm either directly or indirectly as this is the task of the national court and not 
of the European Court of Justice 14; moreover, the reference may not question 
the compatibility of the Community rules and the domestic legal norms, much 
less the possible invalidity of the national rule in conflict with the Community 
norms. These are simple rules and in my opinion it is not worth maintaining the 
possibility to appeal for these reasons. 
As regards the question of appeal, it cannot be disputed that the model in the 
amendment is functional. However, based on the above, it seems more 
reasonable to state that no possibility to appeal against the decision to refer 
should have been provided in the procedure of first instance, either, by the 
amendment. 
— The serious insufficiency of the model of appeal chosen by the amendment 
arises in court procedures of one instance. With a very few exceptions, there is 
no possibility to appeal in actions for judicial review of administrative 
decisions under the Hungarian rules of civil procedure. 
In the foregoing I stressed the importance of providing the possibility to 
appeal both against the decisions to refer and not to refer in all the procedures 
in which the court has the duty to refer according to the law of the European 
Union, under the conditions laid down therein. It seems probable that in 
procedures of one instance where there is no possibility to appeal, Hungarian 
14 E.g. Case C-37/92 José Vanacker and André Lesage and SA Baudoux combustibles [ 1993] 
ECR 1-4947, paras. 6-7. 
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courts will have the duty to refer if they hold the opinion that decision about a 
legal question of the Community is necessary for making their judgement. In 
the case of court procedures of one instance, as they are procedures of first 
instance, the amendment does not provide the possibility to appeal in case the 
court dismisses one of the parties' request for reference. In this case the party in 
question will have no possibility to turn to another court in order to decide 
whether the court fulfilled its obligation incorporated in the law of the 
European Union. As the application of the legal rules of the European Union is 
encountered in actions for judicial review of administrative decisions in most of 
the cases, this insufficiency may have a serious effect in practice, too. 
(2) According to the amendment of the criminal procedure, the general rules 
of appeal against the decision to suspend the procedure are extended to the 
decision to refer. This results in a solution different from the rules of civil 
procedure, at least in the procedure of first instance. Due to the extension, in 
accordance with the new rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the 
possibility to appeal against the decision to refer and against the decision not to 
refer exists both in the procedures of first and second instance. The extension 
of the possibility to appeal may cause problems in the procedure of first 
instance. 
— It is difficult to find reasons which support the provision of the possibility 
to appeal against the decision not to refer in criminal procedures of first 
instance. The court proceeding on first instance has the right but not the duty to 
refer. It is free to decide whether to exercise this right if all the conditions of 
the decision to refer exist. In the light of this the important question is: what 
can such an appeal be based on? What could be the grounds for contesting the 
decision of first instance not to refer, by means of which the court does not 
exercise one of its rights? What can the scope of review be? On what grounds 
can the court of second instance oblige the court of first instance to exercise 
one of its rights — in the absence of obligation — the exercising of which belongs 
entirely to its discretionary powers? In my view there are absolutely no reasons 
for the possibility to appeal against the decision not to refer in criminal 
procedure of first instance, what is more, the legal grounds thereof can hardly 
be determined. My conclusion is that it would suffice to provide the possibility 
to appeal concerning the decisions to refer for preliminary ruling in the 
procedure of second instance, and it is hardly justified in the procedure of first 
instance. 
— The rules of Hungarian criminal procedure acknowledge the investigation 
judge. In their scope of activity, as concerns coercive measures and production 
of evidence, legal questions of the Community may arise which need to be 
elucidated and necessitate reference for preliminary ruling. 
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In Italy investigation judges have made references to the European Court of 
Justice in criminal cases on many occasions. The question whether, with 
respect to the application of Article 234 of the EC Treaty, the Italian 
investigation judge (pretore) fulfilling mainly the tasks of public prosecutor in 
the given criminal case qualifies as a court arose first in the Pretore di Salo v X 
case.'S There the office of the pretore was regarded by the Court as a judicial 
office with the right to refer. After that the Court did not examine in similar 
cases to what extent the pretore can be considered as a court, the reference was 
studied immediately on the merits.' 
On the basis of the reasoning given in the Pretore di Salo v X case the 
Hungarian investigation judge may also have the right to refer. However, this 
does not fit into the system of the Code of Criminal Procedure. According to 
the amendment, the court proceeding in the case is provided with the 
possibility of reference for preliminary ruling together with the suspension of 
the procedure in the court phase. This possibility does not apply to the 
investigation judge. Actually — on the basis of the text of the Code of Criminal 
Procedure — the investigation judge cannot even suspend the procedure, or at 
least no reference is made to this in the text of the law. 
This leads to an interesting situation of procedural law, namely that the law 
of the European Union provides the investigation judge with the theoretical 
possibility to refer for preliminary ruling, while the Hungarian procedural law 
does not give an expressed possibility for this. However, this cannot be an 
obstacle to reference. 
6. The content of the reference 
The rules of civil and criminal procedural law provide for the content of the 
reference in the same manner. According to these, the decision shall contain the 
questions referred, the facts of the case to the extent necessary for answering 
the questions and the relevant Hungarian legal rules. This is important, but on 
the basis of the practice of the European Court of Justice, the reference has to 
contain other things as well. The decision to refer for preliminary ruling also 
has to state the reasons why preliminary ruling is necessary for deciding the 
case. This is not mentioned in the amendment. 
The national court has a general obligation to give information about the 
facts of the case, the questions of domestic law and the reasoning, without 
which no proper preliminary ruling can be made at all." The necessity of giving 
15 Case 14/86 Pretore di Salo v X [ 1987] ECR 2545. 
16 E.g. Case 228/87 Pretura unificata di Torino v X [ 1988] ECR 5099. 
17 Case C-83/91 Wienand Meilicke v ADV/ORGA F. A. Meyer AG [1992]) ECR 1-4871, 
par.26., and see also Joined Cases 36 and 71/80 Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association and 
others v Government of Ireland and others; Martin Doyle and others v An Taoiseach and others 
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detailed information is frequently pointed out by the Court. An increasing 
emphasis is laid by the Court on the requirement of information and reasoning, 
which is evident from many cases decided in the middle of the 19900 
In the European Court of Justice the prerequisite to understanding a case is 
the reasoning given by the reference stating why the court deems the answer to 
the question necessary for deciding the legal dispute, which may concern, for 
example, why the national court considers Community law applicable in the 
case, why the Community legal question has to be decided in order to make a 
judgement in the case, what the relationship of Community law and the relevant 
domestic law is, etc.' 9 In this reasoning the court may expound whether it has 
doubts, and if so of what nature, about the compatibility of the domestic 
regulations to be applied with Community law. This can be expressly useful in 
some cases as the Court can understand the problem to be • solved by the 
national court.'" The referring court is exempt from the duty to provide reasons 
only if it is evident from the matter of the legal dispute why the reference is 
needed in the basic procedure for making a decision. In this case it has to be 
obvious from the matter of the case. 21 
7. Courts obliged to refer 
Those national courts have the duty to refer according to Article 234 of the EC 
Treaty and also in accordance with Article 68 thereof and Article 150 of the 
EURATOM Treaty which make decisions against which there is no legal 
remedy. (The duty to refer is also imposed on courts named in Article 2 of the 
1971 protocol on the interpretation of the Brussels Convention of 1968, which 
has already lost its importance.) The problems associated with the duty to refer 
are the same concerning these three regulations, but in practice they have 
emerged in the course of the application of Article 234. 
The Hungarian court system has four levels, as follows: municipal courts, 
county courts, regional courts of appeal and the Supreme Court. It is of great 
[1981] ECR 0735, par. 6., Joined Cases C-58/95, C-75/95, C-112/95, C-119/95, C-123/95, C-
135/95, C-140/95, C-141/95, C-154/95 and C-157/95 Sandro Gallotti, Roberto Censi, Giuseppe 
Salmaggi, Salvatore Pasquire, Massimo Zappone, Francesco Segna and others , Cesare Cervetti, 
Mario Gasbarri, Isidoro Narducci és Fulvio Smaldone [1996] ECR I-4345, C-167/94 Juan Carlos 
Grau Gomis and others [1995] ECR I-1023, par. 8. 
1" E.g. BLUTMAN L.: Előzetes döntési eljárás az Európai Bíróságon: a szükségesség feltétele. 
Jogtudományi Közlöny 1999/12. 541— 548. p. 
19  E.g. Case C-167/94 Juan Carlos Grau Gomis és mások [1995] ECR I-1023, paras. 8-9. 
211 Joined Cases 141-143/81 Gerrit Holdijk and others [ 1982] ECR 1299, par. 7. 
21 Joined Cases 141-143/81 Gerrit Holdijk and others [1982] ECR 1299, par. 5., Case 244/80 
Pasquale Foglia v Mariella Novello [1981] ECR 3045, par. 17., Joined Cases 98, 162 and 258/85 
Michele Bertini and Giuseppe Bisignani and others v Regione Lazio and Unita sanitarie locali 
[ 1986] ECR 1885, par. 6. 
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consequence on which level the duty to refer opens, that is which courts in the 
Hungarian legal system are subject to paragraph (3) of Article 234. 
The practice of the Member States definitely shows the tendency that the 
exclusion of the possibility of legal remedy is not to be examined generally, one 
always has to examine in the given case whether the possibility for legal 
remedy exists or not. 22 The European Court of Justice also seems to connect the 
opening of the duty to refer to the exclusion of the concrete possibility of legal 
remedy. 23 
The same direction is taken by the Hungarian legal regulation, too. The 
following conclusion is drawn by the Explanation of the act amending the 
regulations of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Code of Criminal Procedure: 
the guarantees contained in Articles 68 and 234 of the EC Treaty would 
become void if they were interpreted as if only those courts . had the duty to 
refer against the decision of which there is never any possibility to appeal. Thus 
this question has to be studied in the light of the given case, not in general. 24 In 
this way whatever the level of the proceeding court is, the duty to refer will 
arise if there is no legal remedy in the given case. 
However, legal remedy may take several forms. Could paragraph (3) refer to 
all forms of legal remedy (including extraordinary legal remedy), or the 
possibility or absence of only certain, typical forms of legal remedy plays a role 
in the opening of the duty to refer. The field of legal remedies the exclusion of 
which results in the duty to refer is essential with respect to preliminary ruling. 
The concept of legal remedy cannot be limited to appeal. Some experts hold 
the view that certain extraordinary legal remedies do not belong to the scope of 
paragraph (3), the possibility thereof does not exempt those courts from the 
duty to refer against the decision of which such extraordinary legal remedy may 
be taken (e.g. starting procedures which do not continue the original 
procedure). 25 The field of legal remedies is very large in the Hungarian legal 
system. It is by no means certain that some forms of extraordinary legal remedy 
can be considered from this aspect. 
(I) Appeal. Appeal is a legal remedy which has a similar content in the 
Hungarian legal system as in other states. The possibility to appeal against the 
judgement on the merits definitely excludes the courts of first instance from the 
range of courts with the duty to refer, as legal remedy is available against their 
decision. 
(2) Review. A review may be initiated against final judgements on the 
merits in the Hungarian procedural law, but only if very strict conditions are 
22  See note 4: General report, point 3.5. 
23  Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v E.N.E.L. [1964] ECR 1141., see also ANDERSON, D.W.K. — 
DEMETRIOU, M.: References to the European Court. London 2002. p. 165. 
24  Explanation, Particular Provisions / 3— 4. §/ point 5. 
25 SMIT, H. — HERZOG, P.: The Law of the European Community. New York 1999. p. 478. 
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fulfilled. In the majority of the cases it is a means of legal remedy of third 
instance. According to the interpretation and application of the text of Article 
234 of the EC Treaty, review qualifies as extraordinary legal remedy. In 
practice it is encountered only in a small number of cases. 
In criminal cases the field of review is limited as it can cover only legal 
questions and does not have an automatic suspending effect. In civil cases 
review is a procedure of different type than in criminal cases. Here it is 
primarily a form of procedure ensuring uniform legal practice. The field of 
review is limited, and even a previous breach of law influencing the merits of 
the case is not sufficient in itself to provide grounds for the review. A special 
permission is required for review, and it has no automatic suspending effect. 
In the light of the above it seems well-founded to hold the view that in 
criminal cases the theoretical possibility of review against the decision of the 
court cannot exempt the court proceeding on second instance from the duty to 
refer. If the possibility of review exempted the court proceeding on second 
instance from the duty to refer, this duty would not open in the majority of 
cases (raising Community legal questions). This conflicts with the purpose of 
Article 234. 
Moreover, it seems that the conditions in the Lyckeskog decision" do not 
apply either, and the theoretical possibility of review against the decision of the 
court does not exempt the court proceeding on second instance from the duty to 
refer. The same conclusion is drawn in the Explanation of the amendment in 
connection with the possibility of review opening in civil cases. 27 
Reopening a case. In the process of reopening a case the right to refer 
cannot be disputed in the light of the practice of the European Court of Justice 
to date. However, the theoretical possibility of reopening a case does not 
exempt the court making the final judgement on the merits from referring. 
Consequently, the statements made concerning review also apply to reopening a 
case. 
Constitutional complaint. In Hungary anyone can make a constitutional 
complaint to the Constitutional Court if a legal rule in conflict with the 
Constitution was applied in their case. The constitutional complaint qualifies as 
extraordinary legal remedy. 
In general, constitutional courts qualify as courts against the decision of 
which there is no possibility of legal remedy. On the basis of Article 234 of the 
EC Treaty, the right of constitutional courts to refer is not questioned in the law 
of the Community. Constitutional courts have actually made references in 
several cases. 2R The really interesting question is whether these references are 
26  Case C-99/00 Kenny Roland Lyckeskog [2002] ECR 4839, paras. 17- 19. 
27  Explanation, Particular Provisions /3-4. §/ point 5. 
28 Case C-143/99 Adria-Wien Pipeline GmbH and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke 
GmbH v Finanzlandesdirektion für Krnten [2001] ECR 1-8365, Case C-93/97 Fédération Belge 
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made on the basis of the second or third paragraph of Article 234, based on the 
right or duty to refer. However, this is not evident from the cases and the Court 
did not examine this question. The Court evidently acknowledges that the 
reference has been made by constitutional courts, just as it acknowledges that 
the constitutional courts of certain states do not make references. With this 
respect the Court considers it essential that the duty to refer shall open in a 
given procedure. It is of no importance in which court it does so. 
However, it seems evident that the court making a final judgement cannot be 
exempted from the duty to refer by the theoretical possibility of submitting a 
constitutional complaint. The reason for this is that it is a restricted and 
extraordinary means used only in a negligible number of cases. 
To summarise the above: if in the Hungarian legal system legal remedies 
other than appeal were considered in ordinary procedures with respect to the 
arising of the duty to refer, in many cases this duty would not open in practice. 
This is due to the fact that, with the exception of appeal, these remedies are 
exceptional and are encountered only in a slight number of cases as both the 
possibility of their use and their scope are very limited. Consequently, the 
conclusion can be drawn that these means cannot be considered in weighing the 
opening of the duty to refer, that is all the Hungarian courts the decision of 
which cannot be appealed against may have the duty to refer. It seems that in 
the Hungarian legal system there is no legal remedy which would be suitable 
for exempting the court making the final judgement from this duty. 
The above conclusion does not necessarily apply to extraordinary 
procedures. Whether the duty to refer may arise in extraordinary procedures 
and if so, under what conditions, is the subject of another examination. 
8. Legal effect of preliminary rulings in Hungarian law" 
It is not simple to judge the legal effect of the decisions of the European Court 
of Justice beyond the concrete case. This issue arises here because the 
Explanation of the amendment makes two references to the fact that 
preliminary rulings made by the European Court of Justice have a binding force 
beyond the concrete case. 31 
At present it is a widely disputed question to what extent the preliminary 
rulings of the European Court of Justice containing legal interpretation are 
binding beyond the case from which the reference was made. As far as I know 
the Court has never declared anywhere that preliminary rulings containing legal 
des Chambres Syndicales de Médecins ASBL v Flemish Government, Government of the French 
Community, Council of Minister [ 1998] ECR 1-4837. 
29  See also BLUTMAN L.: European Court of Justice: a shamefaced system of precedent? Acta 
Jur. et Pol. Szeged Tomus LXIV. 77— 92. p. 
30  Explanation, General Part, points I.3.3. and 1.6. 
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interpretation are binding for everybody, and the examples quoted in the 
Explanation are not suitable for proving this. In the quoted cases the Court 
only stated that its decisions have a legal effect beyond the concrete case, but it 
did not state that this legal effect entails the obligation to follow these decisions 
in general. The content of the legal effect is rather that in similar cases national 
courts can base their decisions on the previous statements of the European 
Court of Justice, and that they are exempt from the duty to refer if the Court has 
already made a preliminary ruling in a similar case. 
Needless to say, the domestic law can prescribe that the judgements of the 
Court are to be followed by the national courts (this was expressly done in the 
United Kingdom). However, this is a matter of domestic law, not of the law of 
the European Union. The question arises whether the contents of the 
Explanation can be regarded as implying that the Hungarian law-maker 
considers it compulsory for the Hungarian courts, to follow preliminary rulings 
with legal interpretation beyond the-concrete case? This question, however, will 
be answered only by the practice. 
LÁSZLÓ BLUTMAN 
ELŐZETES DÖNTÉSHOZATAL: KIHÍVÁSOK ÉS JOGI 
FELTÉTELEK A MAGYAR BELSŐ JOGBAN 
(Összefoglalás) 
A szerző áttekint néhány általános problémát, melyek a magyar bíróságok 
számára adódnak Magyarország uniós csatlakozása után. Ezen belül a 
tanulmány főként az előzetes döntéshozatali eljárást veszi szemügyre, melynek 
igénybevétele az európai igazságszolgáltatási rendszer részévé váló magyar 
bíróságok számára néhány eljárásbeli nehézséggel járhat. Elemzi a polgári 
eljárás és a büntetőeljárás szabályait módosító szabályokat, melyek az előzetes 
döntéshozatal magyar eljárásokba való beillesztését szolgálják: így vizsgálja 
többek között az eljárás felfüggesztését, az előterjesztésről hozott döntések 
fellebbezhetőségét, az előzetes döntés előterjesztésére kötelezett bíróságok 
körét. 
